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ABSTRACT 
As windfarms are moving further offshore, their maintenance has to be supported by the new 
generation Service Operation Vessels (SOV) with Dynamic Positioning capabilities. For the SOV 
safe operations it is crucial that any hazardous scenario is properly controlled. Whilst international 
regulations require the implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for SOV power 
systems, FMEA has been criticised for not addressing properly failures in control systems. In this 
study, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is employed for identifying the hazardous 
scenarios in terms of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) in Direct Current (DC) and DC with batteries 
power systems. Then the identified UCAs are ranked based on their risk. The results demonstrate 
that the number of hazardous scenarios derived by the STPA increases in a power system with 
batteries in comparison to a conventional DC power system, thus depicting higher complexity of this 
system. However, the increase in overall risk is small and within acceptable limits, whilst the risk 
reduces for a number of UCAs leading to Diesel Generator overload sub-hazard. 
 
Keywords: Windfarm Service Operation Vessels, Safety, Blackouts, Diesel-Electric Propulsion, 
Hybrid Diesel-Electric Propulsion 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Offshore wind-faming is becoming a major source of the renewable energy in many countries. 
However, the offshore wind farms maintenance cost currently impacts on the competitiveness of the 
electricity produced. Present safety requirements and needs of the service personnel influence wind 
farm locations and operational flexibility. Consequently, future Service Operation Vessels (SOVs) 
need to be more efficient and safer in order to meet future demands. Next generation support vessels 
providing safe and more efficient offshore wind farm servicing (the EU-funded NEXUS project) is 
aiming to deliver an advanced SOV design optimised for efficiency, performance, safety, and 
working environment whilst minimising costs throughout the life-cycle by 20% compared to the 
current state of the art vessels (EC, 2019). As wind farms are moving further from the coast, 
significant innovations in the SOV design are required. This, together with stringer emission 
regulations and fluidity in the fuel market prices, render attractive the use of alternative fuels and 
power generation systems, including hybrid power supply, where diesel-generators and batteries 
are used to cover ship energy needs. 
 
The incorporation of batteries achieves fuel consumption reduction by running Diesel 
Generator (D/G) sets at optimum load by peak load shaving and functioning as a spinning reserve 
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(Brandsaeter, Valoen, Mollestad, & Haugom, 2015; Geertsma, Negenborn, Visser, & Hopman, 2017; 
Räsänen, 2017). Implementation of batteries support the D/G sets downsizing, which results in the 
D/G sets operation at their most efficient load ranges (Brandsaeter et al., 2015). Other advantages 
include higher redundancy in the system and lower emissions due to the batteries charging from the 
local grid in harbour (Brandsaeter et al., 2015; Geertsma et al., 2017). On the SOV, due to the 
Dynamic Positioning (DP) power requirements, the D/G sets are often oversized or pushed to 
operate at lower loads to be able to withstand a sudden loss of a D/G set in adverse weather 
conditions. Therefore, incorporation of batteries to provide the necessary spinning reserve during 
faulty conditions or power during power peaks on SOV can provide substantial benefits in terms of 
fuel savings during DP and other operations. Batteries disadvantages include relatively high 
procurement cost (Brandsaeter et al., 2015; Geertsma et al., 2017), large batteries size and weight 
(Räsänen, 2017), limited number of recharging cycles (Räsänen, 2017) and addition of new 
hazardous scenarios to the system (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Boulougouris, & Vassalos, 2019; 
Brandsaeter et al., 2015). 
 
On the next generation SOV, with increased technicians and crew numbers, ensuring safety 
of power generation system is paramount as any malfunctions such as blackout or brownout may 
lead to contact/collision/grounding. These accidents in turn can result in ships progressive flooding 
and capsize with crew and technicians getting drown (Vassalos et al., 2019). In addition, the 
introduction of batteries increases hazardous scenarios number resulting in fire, explosion and crew 
intoxication (Brandsaeter et al., 2015), e.g., a fire on hybrid-electric tugboat occurred due to 
malfunction of Battery Management System (Hill, Agarwal, & Gully, 2015), whilst a number of similar 
incidences have been reported in other industries (Hill et al., 2015). In this respect, it is crucial to 
ensure that all these scenarios are identified and properly addressed during the system design. 
 
The primary reference for designing safe power generation systems is the IMO regulations 
(Organization, 2014) and classification society rules (DNVGL, 2015). Currently, the main hazard 
identification method in the DP systems is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), which is 
applied to ensure adequate system components redundancy (DNVGL, 2015; IMCA, 2015). In 
previous studies, a high-level FMEA has been used for comparative safety analysis of different 
propulsion systems, including power system with batteries in other ships, for example a Ferry boat 
in (Jeong, Oguz, Wang, & Zhou, 2018). However, FMEA has been criticised for not addressing 
properly the automation functions in the system (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Bujorianu, Boulougouris, & 
Vassalos, 2019; Rokseth, Utne, & Vinnem, 2017; Sulaman, Beer, Felderer, & Höst, 2017; Thomas, 
2013). On the other hand, control and automation functions have an important role for power 
generation on DP vessels (United Kingdom Protection & Indemnity Club, 2015). Considering this, 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has been proposed to be used to address the 
complexity in interactions between the control systems and physical processes (N. G. Leveson, 
2011). In (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Boulougouris, et al., 2019) the safety of hybrid-electric propulsion 
system and classical propulsion system using Alternate Current for electrical power distribution has 
been compared using STPA on a cruise ship vessel. Other studies have referred to potential safety 
issues on ship power systems with batteries but they did not follow a hazard identification method 
for their analysis (Hill et al., 2015). 
 
Pertinent literature reveals a number of research gaps: (a) hazard analysis of power systems 
with Direct Current (DC) power network and DC power with batteries system on SOV using STPA 
and (b) incorporation of risk as a measure in STPA to compare different designs. The research gap 
leads to the aim of this study, which is to analyse the safety of power systems on SOV with batteries 
using STPA and to compare it with standard DC power systems in terms of risk. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: in section two, the methodology steps are presented; in 
section three, a short description of the analysed system is provided; in section four, the analysis 
results and safety recommendations are given; finally, in section five, the main findings of this study 
are summarised. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
As it has been referred in the introduction, STPA has been selected in this study to identify the 
hazardous scenarios. However STPA has been criticised for not allowing risk estimation and 
criticality analysis (Dawson et al., 2015); for this reason the STPA method has been enhanced. The 
method steps are presented in Figure 1 and described in more detail below. 
 
STPA defines the accident as: “an undesired and unplanned event that results in loss, 
including loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, mission loss, 
financial loss, etc.” (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). The hazards in the STPA framework are understood 
as: “system states or set of conditions that together with a worst-case set of environmental 
conditions, will lead to an accident” (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). The hazards in STPA are viewed 
on a system level, so they go beyond the single failures that may occur in the system and should be 
referred to a specific state of the system. Sub-hazards are considered states in a worst-case 
scenario leading to hazard realisation. Generic requirements can be specified, based on the hazards 
and sub hazards. 
 
The development of a functional control structure is one of the differentiating points of the 
STPA analysis, compared with the other methods (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). Usually, it starts with 
a high-level abstraction of the system and proceeds to a more detailed system description. The initial 
control structure consists of the high-level controller, the human operator and the controlled process 
with the basic control, feedback and communication links. A more detailed description would 
incorporate a hierarchy of controllers. Both high-level and detailed control structure can be used for 
the safety analysis at different system design stages. After the development of the basic control 
structure, the next step is its refinement. The required actions include a) the identification of each 
controller responsibilities; b) the process model with process variables and potential process variable 
values; c) the control actions; d) the behaviour of the actuators; e) the information from the sensors; 
f) the information from the other controllers. 
 
The actual hazards identification starts by finding the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). The 
possible ways to proceed are either by using the control actions types as initially proposed for the 
STPA (N. Leveson, 2011) or by using the context tables as proposed in Thomas (2013). Herein, the 
second of the two approaches has been selected. According to both approaches, the possible UCAs 
can be of the following seven types (Leveson & Thomas, 2018): 
 Not providing the action leads to a hazard. 
 Providing of a UCA that leads to a hazard. 
 Providing the control action too late.  
Figure 1 STPA steps. 
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 Providing the control action too early. 
 Providing the control action out of sequence. 
 Control action is stopped too soon  
 Control action is applied for too long. 
 
According to the STPA, there is also another type of UCA, when the safe control action is 
provided but is not followed. This type of failure mode is addressed during the identification of causal 
factors in the second step of the method. Similarly, with the system hazards, safety constraints can 
be derived for the UCAs, aiding the identification of possible safety barriers. 
 
The second step in the hazard identification of the STPA has the purpose of determining all 
the scenarios and causal factors leading to the UCAs. This is done by examining the hazardous 
scenarios, including software and physical failures as well as design errors. There are several ways 
to organise the results of the hazardous scenarios by using tables or lists. In this work, the process 
was augmented by a checklist, developed on the basis of previous studies (Becker & Van Eikema 
Hommes, 2014; Blandine, 2013). The main categories of causal factors are: 
 Inappropriate control input 
 Hardware failure 
 Software faulty implementation 
 Software faulty design 
 Erroneous or missing input 
 Inadequate control command transmission 
 Flawed execution due to failures in actuator or physical process 
 Conflicting control actions 
The systemic and contributory causal factors (Puisa, Lin, Bolbot, & Vassalos, 2018) have not 
been considered during identification of the causal factors, as the implementations of proper training 
for system operator and maintenance is out of the scope of system designer. The aim of the designer 
is to ensure the adequate reliability and availability of system functions. Therefore, the aim of the 
analysis is to rank the different hazardous scenarios identified by the STPA to allow better allocation 
of resources to specific controllers; hence the different scenarios (UCAs) risk is estimated. 
 
The new part of the STPA in the presented methodology is the risk estimation for the identified 
UCAs. The basic assumption behind the estimation is that UCA can be considered as the central 
undesired event in the system, thus being in the centre of the Bow Tie as depicted in Figure 2. Then 
the total risk can be estimated as aggregation of individual UCAs risks. In a similar way with Level 
of Protection Analysis method (BSI, 2004), the risk of an UCA is considered dependent on its causal 
factors, the effectiveness of mitigation barriers, and coincidence with inadvertent environmental 
factors. If the causal factors likelihood, the accident severity, the mitigation barriers/measures 
effectiveness and relevant inadvertent environmental factors are quantified, the risk for each UCA 
can be estimated. 
 
For the analysis presented in the methodology herein, with the exception of the above, the 
following additional assumptions have been made: 
 The UCAs causal factors are independent (Blandine, 2013) as the systemic and contributory 
factors (Puisa et al., 2018) are omitted as the focus is on the system design. 
 If UCA leads to more than two hazards, then paths with the smaller risk can be ignored. 
 Similarly, if multiple causal factors result in UCAs, the causal factors with smaller likelihood can 
be ignored for estimations. 
 The overall risk can be aggregated and calculated for the system based on individual UCAs risk. 
 Each mitigation barrier can mitigate the 90% of relevant hazardous conditions. This is rather a 
conservative assumption with regard to effectiveness of mitigation barriers (BSI, 2004). 
 The UCA causal factors frequency and the UCA context factors frequency are independent from 
each other. 
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 The UCA causal factors frequency is estimated by considering it together with the relevant UCAs 
preventative barriers effectiveness. 
 Accidents are considered as disjoint and independent. 
 If UCAs are caused by other UCAs (they are practically their causal factors), then these causal 
UCAs are omitted for estimation of risk for UCAs. Instead, these causal UCAs are considered to 
contribute to risk independently from other UCAs. 
 Causal factors resulting in multiple UCAs occurring are repeated for each UCA risk estimation, 
as this assumption has no influence on estimation of the total risk. 
 
The Potential Loss of Life (   ) is one of the expressions of Societal Risk (International 
Maritime Organisation, 2013) and is defined as expected value of the number of fatalities per year 
(International Maritime Organisation, 2013; Vinnem, 2014): 
 
    = ∑ ∑                   (1) 
 
Where     is the annual frequency of accidental scenario (event tree terminal event)   with 
personal consequences   and     is expected number of fatalities in each accidental scenario (event 
tree terminal event)   with personal consequences  . 
 
The     is connected to the Individual Risk (IR) according to the following equation (Johansen 
& Rausand, 2012),  where N is the number of people in population exposed to risk: 
 
    =               (2) 
 
Based on the assumptions above, the      can be approximated as sum of risk of   individual 
UCAs as follows: 
 
       = ∑   
 
            (3) 
 
Now the risk    for each UCA using    frequency of accidental scenario and    consequence 
of accidental scenario expressed in fatalities per year is estimated as follows: 
Figure 2 The simplified Bow Tie 
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   =     ×          [fatalities per ship-year] (4) 
 
The frequency of each accidental scenario is estimated using UCA frequency     , 
effectiveness of mitigation controls   and probability of inadvertent environmental context   as in 
eq. (5) and the severity of each accidental scenario is estimated as in eq.(6): 
 
   =       ×   ×   =      × 10
     × 10       [events per ship-year] (5) 
   = 10
            [fatalities per events] (6) 
 
The ranking    for effectiveness of mitigation measures is implemented according to Table 1. 
For the ranking    of available mitigating barriers, different mitigating barriers type are considered 
namely a) the presence of redundant component implementing the same function with the faulty 
one, b) available safety or reconfiguration functions c) humans operators rectification actions. The 
ranking of inadvertent environmental factors (  ) is implemented as in Table 3. The Severity Index 
for accident (   ) is selected according to Table 2 retrieved from Formal Safety Assessment 
Guidelines (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). 
 
The UCA is described by referring to the controller, the control action, the control action failure 
type, the context and the link to the hazard (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). Practically though, an UCA 
will occur if specific control action failure mode is realised in specific context. In case of a Fault Tree 
this relationship would be represented using AND gate, hence multiplication between frequency of 
control action failure mode and probability of specific context is required. However, the control action 
failure mode can be attributed to the specific causal factors, identified previously, which can be 
connected using OR gate to the UCA (Blandine, 2013). Wrong execution practically refers to one of 
the UCAs types (Leveson & Thomas, 2018) and has been already included in identification of causal 
factors. Therefore, the UCAs frequency (    ) is estimated as in eq.(7) using frequency of causal 
factors     leading to relevant control action failure mode, the number of controllers   in system, 
which can implement the specific UCA and the probability of the UCA context: 
 
     =   ×          × 10
         [events per ship-year] (7) 
 
The     is ranked using Table 4, retrieved from Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines 
(International Maritime Organisation, 2013) and is estimated as in eq.(8), whilst     ranking used 
for estimating the probability of UCA context is based on Table 5. 
 
     = 10
             [events per ship-year] (8) 
 
Table 1 Ranking for availability of UCAs mitigation measures 
Ranking (  ) Definition Unavailability of mitigation 
measures 
6 No controls provided 10-0 
5 Some mitigation controls availability  
(One control barrier) 
10-1 
4 Adequate mitigation controls availability 
(Two control barriers) 
10-2 
3 Rare mitigation controls unavailability 
(Three control barriers) 
10-3 
2 Remote mitigations controls unavailability 
(Four control barriers) 
10-4 
1 Extremely remote mitigations controls unavailability 
(Five control barriers and above) 
10-5 
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Table 2 Ranking for severity of UCAs hazards/accidents (International Maritime 
Organisation, 2013). 
Ranking 
(   ) 
Definition Effects on human  
Safety 
Effects on 
ship 
Oil spillage Equivalent 
fatalities 
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities Total loss Oil spill size between 
< 100 - 1000 tonnes 
10 
3 Severe Single fatality or 
multiple severe 
injuries 
Severe 
damage 
Oil spill size between 
< 10 - 100 tonnes 
10-0 
2 Significant Multiple or severe 
injuries 
Non-severe 
ship damage 
Oil spill size between 
< 1 - 10 tonnes 
10-1 
1 Minor Single or minor 
injuries 
Local 
equipment 
damage 
Oil spill size < 1 
tonne 
10-2 
 
Table 3 Ranking for inadvertent environmental factors. 
Ranking (  ) Definition Probability of inadvertent 
environmental factors  
3 Uncontrolled UCA will always lead to accident 10-0 
2 Uncontrolled UCA will sometimes lead to accident 10-1 
1 Uncontrolled UCA  will rarely lead to accident 10-2 
 
Table 4 Ranking for causal factors frequency (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). 
Ranking 
(    ) 
Definition F  
(per ship 
year) 
F  
(per ship 
hour) 
7 Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 1.14 10-3 
5 Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, i.e. likely to 
occur a few times during the ship's life 
10-1 1.14 10-5 
3 Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships, i.e. likely 
to occur in the total life of several similar ships 
10-3 1.14 10-7 
1 Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of a world fleet 
of 5,000 ships 
10-5 1.14 10-9 
 
Table 5 Probability of UCA context. 
Ranking (   ) Definition Probability of inadvertent 
environmental factors  
4 Always 10-0 
3 Sometimes 10-1 
2 Rarely 10-2 
1 Remotely 10-3 
3 CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION 
The initial power system and hybrid-electric power system single line diagram are presented 
in Figure 4 whilst the functional control structure for both systems is given in Figure 3. Two 
switchboards and engine rooms are required to comply with the DP requirements. The power 
network is of the Direct Current type. Power Management System (PMS) starts/stops the engines 
based on the ship consumers electric load demand. Switchover between the plant Diesel Generators 
(D/G) is implemented based on the D/G sets running hours. The PMS can implement a fast-electrical 
load reduction for the propulsion motors and bow thrusters as well as preferential tripping functions 
(fast load reduction) by tripping electrical consumers. The D/G sets can operate in the variable speed 
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mode and their power output is regulated by speed governor (ECU 7) and Automatic Voltage 
Regulator (AVR) whilst delivered power to network through converters is controlled by the Generator 
Control Unit (GCU). A number of other smaller functions are supported by EIM and EMU units on 
the D/G sets. Power transferred between sections is controlled by Bus Tie Unit (BTU). Several safety 
systems are used to trip the D/G sets and the propulsion motors if a fault had been observed.  
 
In the investigated hybrid-electric power system, in addition to the initial system components, 
one battery pack per switchboard is installed. The battery output and condition are controlled by a 
dedicated Battery Management System (BMS), which monitors the actual battery health state, the 
battery and cell capacity and controls the battery cells charge status, the discharging/charging rate, 
the power output and the battery auxiliary systems. The BMS communicates with PMS to determine 
the actual power status and power demand implementing in this way the Energy Management 
System functions. The BMS also communicates with fire-fighting systems to ensure the firefighting 
Figure 4 Power network layout diagram 
Figure 3 Power network control structure 
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actions operation. Battery capacity is considered adequate to cover the whole ship power demand 
for a limited period. The considered battery is of Li-Ion type. 
 
The following has been assummed with respect to the systems operation: 
 The power system control network is isolated from other networks, so no hazardous scenarios 
are developed in the system because of cyber-attacks. 
 The human operator does not introduce new hazards, only mitigates them. 
 Power plant operates with the bus-tie circuit breaker disconnected. 
 Power can be transferred from switchboard to a switchboard using converters at Bow thruster 
motor 3. 
With respect to the case study it has assumed that the     for each UCA is either 2 (Significant) 
or 3 (Severe). In addition the number of people on the ship, including crew and technicians has been 
estimated as 60. 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on previous Formal Safety Assessment studies, the following causality scenarios can 
be considered as accidents (IMO, 2008):  
 Collision [A-1] 
 Contact [A-2] 
 Grounding [A-3] 
 Fire [A-4] 
 Explosion [A-5] 
 Machinery damage [A-6] 
 Foundering [A-7] 
 Operating personnel injury or death [A-8] 
These accidents are not fully disjoint, as a fire can lead to collision and vice versa (Hamann, 
Papanikolaou, Eliopoulou, & Golyshev, 2013). In addition, numerous hazards can be connected to 
the accidents on a cruise ship and there can be interactions between different hazards. Herein, the 
most important and those related to the system under analysis are referred (Bolbot, Theotokatos, & 
Vassalos, 2018; IMO, 2008): 
 Propulsion loss [H-1] leading to collision, contact and grounding accidents. The propulsion loss 
can be further developed into the following sub-hazards: 
o D/G sets overload [H-1-1]. 
o Transients [H-1-2]. 
o Imbalanced power generation [H-1-3] 
o D/G sets unavailability [H-1-4] 
o Batteries unavailability [H-1-5] 
o Propulsion motors unavailability [H-1-6] 
 Conditions contributing to fire in the engine room [H-2]. 
 Uncontrolled electrical faults in equipment leading to [H-3] fire and explosions in system 
components or blackout (propulsion loss). 
 Toxic/flammable atmosphere in battery room leading to crew intoxication and/or fire [H-4]. 
 Anomalous conditions in batteries leading to fire and its expansion [H-5].  
 Arson – deliberate act resulting in fire [H-6]. 
 Human erroneous operation [H-7] 
 Cyber-attack leading to any of previous hazards [H-8]. 
 Water ingress [H-9] 
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Although, it is acknowledged that there is contribution from hazards [H-6]-[H-9] to the overall 
system risk, these hazards can be considered as external to the system presented in Figure 4 and 
Figure 3 and thus their analysis has been omitted. The interconnection between hazards and 
accidents is schematically shown in Figure 5. 
 
The developed control structure has been already provided in Figure 3. The difference 
between the two power systems can be found in the presence of Battery Management System and 
additional interactions between the fire-fighting system and the power system. The description of 
responsibilities of each controller and their control actions, although necessary and used for the 
analysis, have been omitted for brevity and confidentiality purposes. 
 
The results of applying STPA and risk analysis and comparing the different results are 
presented in Table 7, Table 8, Figure 6 and Figure 7. A guiding example of application of the method 
is provided in Table 6. As it can be observed from Table 7, the number of the UCAs and the 
associated causal factors is significantly higher in the system with batteries. This is owed to the 
increased number of interactions between the control systems and the physical processes in a power 
system with batteries. However, the estimated risk is only slightly higher in the power system with 
batteries. The estimated individual risk for different Severity Indexes is smaller than negligible 10-6 
and in every case smaller than the maximum tolerable risk for the crew 10-3 and maximum tolerable 
risk for passengers 10-4 (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). So it can be considered as 
acceptable. However, it should be noted that the estimated risk includes only failures in control 
systems, whilst some scenarios that could be potentially identified with FMEA have not been 
addressed. Consequently, the estimated risk would be greater, if FMEA related accidental scenarios 
have been incorporated. It should be also noted, that there is a specific subjectivity in the analysis, 
as a) uncertainty in the estimated frequencies and probabilities has not been incorporated and b) 
there are numerical approximations in calculations due to the use of tables with rankings. 
Consequently, the estimated risk must be taken with precaution. The subjectivity that exists in the 
risk assessments is one of its major weaknesses (Aven, 2016; Goerlandt, Khakzad, & Reniers, 
2016). Last, but not least the risk is estimated for a system and not the whole vessel, so it can be 
used for comparison with acceptable values with precaution; it can be used though for comparison 
of different systems and scenarios. 
 
As it can be observed from the Table 8, the incorporation of batteries reduces the risk in all the 
controllers but BMS. In addition, from the Figure 6, it can be observed that the contribution of the 
D/G sets overload [H-1-1] sub-hazard to risk is smaller in the system with batteries than in the initial 
system design. This can be attributed to the fact that batteries act as an additional barrier to the 
overload sub-hazard. However, despite this, the total fire risk (including H-2 and H-5 hazards) as 
can be observed is significantly higher in the system with batteries, as the batteries themselves are 
a new potential source of fire. 
 
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 7, it can be observed that the relative contribution to the total 
risk of the UCAs related to [H-1-1] sub-hazard (48%) is double of the relative contribution of the 
UCAs number associated with [H-1-1] sub-hazard to the total (24% in the initial design). Similarly, 
the number of the UCAs contributing to H-1-4 sub-hazard is 34% of the total contribution number, 
yet their risk is only 11% of the total. This is due to the abundancy of barriers tackling the problem 
of the D/G sets unavailability (sub-hazard [H-1-4]), compared to the other hazards, such as 
redundancy in available D/G sets, whilst D/G set overload condition (sub-hazard [H-1-1]) can lead 
to a hazardous condition if few barriers are faulty. Therefore, the scenario number can be considered 
as inappropriate metric for safety comparison of different systems. 
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Table 6 Example of application of the method. 
Controller Controlee 
Control 
action 
Failure 
mode Context Assumption 
Hazar
d /Sub 
hazard Accident 
Causal 
factor 
Mitigating 
barriers 
Environmental 
factors m                    Risk 
Fire  
Fighting 
 control DG sets 
Disconnec
t energy 
supply 
Providing 
causes 
hazards 
Power 
demand 
status is 
HIGH and 
Operating 
status is 
ENGAGE
D 
Loss of power 
generation for 
several D/G 
sets 
simultaneousl
y H-1-1 
Collision/ 
Contact/ 
Grounding 
[A-1],[A-2], 
[A-3] 
Wrong 
softwar
e rules 
A) Engine 
room crew 
restoring 
normal 
provision of 
fuel to the D/G 
sets 
B) Propulsion 
motors power 
reduction 
systems 
A) Other 
vessels in 
proximity 
B) Inadequate 
communicatio
n between 
vessels crew 
C) Bad 
weather 
conditions 4 3 4 3 1 3 
4x10
-7 
 
Figure 5 Interconnection between hazards and accidents. 
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Some critical UCAs are provided in Table 7. As it can be observed, failures in the power 
reduction functions applied during hazardous conditions are considered as the most critical in both 
systems, as they constitute the last safety barrier before blackout in the systems. Another critical 
failure is the faulty tripping of the D/G sets by the firefighting system in an engine room, as in this 
case more than one D/G set can be disconnected from the network, leading to D/G sets overload 
conditions. In a power system with batteries, the batteries failures management is also considered 
as critical, as it can lead to fire with a reduced mitigation measures number. Hence, proper design 
and testing of these functions shall be ensured in the power system. 
Table 7 Comparison between initial and system with batteries. 
STPA results Initial design Batteries included 
UCA number 215 300 (+40%) 
Causal factors 
number 
2247 3228 (+43%) 
Estimated risk PLL 
[fatalities/year] 
6.19 10-7 (SI=2) – 6.19 10-6 (SI=3) 7.17 10-7 (SI=2) –  7.17 10-6 (SI=3) (+16%) 
Estimated risk  
IR 
[fatalities/year] 
1.03 10-8 (SI=2) – 1.03 10-7 (SI=3) 1.20 10-8 (SI=2) – 1.20 10-7 (SI=3) 
Sample of most 
critical UCAs 
- Firefighting system falsely 
activates quick closing fuel valve 
- Power Management System 
(PMS) disconnects consumers 
necessary for power generation 
functions, during overload 
conditions 
- PMS falsely reduces the 
propulsion motors and bow 
thrusters speed (and hence load) 
- PMS trying to disconnect the  
already disconnected heavy 
consumers, hence not allowing 
the implementation of power 
reduction function on propulsion 
motors and thrusters. 
- PMS failing to reduce thrusters 
load 
- Battery management system not 
disconnecting the batteries from the 
network during electrical fault 
- Battery management system not 
increasing the cooling during electrical 
fault conditions. 
- Firefighting system falsely activates 
quick closing fuel valve 
- PMS falsely reduces the propulsion 
motors and the bow thrusters speed (and 
hence load) 
- PMS trying to disconnect the  
already disconnected heavy consumers, 
hence not allowing the implementation of 
power reduction function on propulsion 
motors and the thrusters. 
 
Table 8 Distribution of risks for initial and system with batteries. 
Controller Initial PLL Hybrid PLL 
AVR 4.80E-07 4.80E-07 
BMS 0.00E+00 1.90E-06 
Bus-tie controller 1.10E-07 1.10E-07 
ECU 7 controller 4.53E-07 3.41E-07 
EIM controller 3.57E-07 1.30E-07 
Firefighting controller 1.08E-06 1.08E-06 
GCU 1.08E-06 9.67E-07 
PMS 2.62E-06 2.15E-06 
Sea Water Cooling Pump controller 1.60E-08 1.42E-08 
Thermostat 1.60E-09 1.42E-09 
Total 6.19E-06 7.17E-06 
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As it can be observed from the results, the method allowed a rough estimation of the risk 
metrics for different hazardous scenarios, the overall risk for the system and comparison of risk for 
different systems. It was also possible to estimate the risk for different hazards and controllers. 
Furthermore, the most critical controllers and scenarios in each system were highlighted. However 
the estimated risk was not for the whole ship but for a specific system which complicated the 
comparison with IMO acceptable values. In additions for the system risk estimation, some failure 
driven scenarios have not been included. Further guidance on how to estimate the UCA 
consequences and inadvertent environmental factors probability would be also beneficial for this 
approach. Last, but not least there are several numerical approximations in the methods. 
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Figure 6 Distribution of estimated risk per hazards a) for initial power system b) for power 
system with batteries. 
a) b) 
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Figure 7 Distribution of identified UCAs per hazard a) for the initial system b) for the system 
with batteries. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, a new approach for estimating risk metrics in a system based on the STPA has 
been presented. The proposed approach was applied for comparison of Direct Current power system 
with Direct Current power system with batteries on an SOV vessel. 
 
The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows: 
 The new method allowed risk metrics estimation and comparison for different systems as well as 
ranking of different scenarios. 
 The estimated risk for the failures in control systems, for both systems, is in tolerable regions, 
according to criteria set by the method. 
 The risk, in the power system with batteries may slightly increase due to the increase in the 
number of scenarios leading to fire 
 The risk due to D/G sets overload reduces in system with batteries as batteries act as an 
additional barrier to the propulsion loss hazard. 
 Comparing the number of hazardous scenarios for two systems can lead to wrong conclusions. 
Still the hazardous scenarios number can be used for comparison of systems complexity. 
 The new approach can be used as basis for development of a method for safety comparison 
between cyber-physical systems. 
Whilst the applied methodology was useful for identifying the critical UCAs and comparing risk 
metrics failures for different systems, still it can be considered as a premature. The methodology 
could be enhanced by incorporating uncertainty analysis or by integrating it with other methods. The 
approach could also be enhanced by incorporating multiple experts ranking. However, all these 
constitute suggestions for future research. 
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ABRREVIATIONS LIST 
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator 
BMS Battery Management System 
BTU Bus Tie Unit 
D/G Diesel Generator 
DC Direct Current 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
SOV Service Operation Vessels 
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
PMS Power Management System 
PLL Potential Loss of Life 
UCA Unsafe Control Actions 
 
 
